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Another View of Family Conflict and
Family Wholeness**
C. Terry Warner and Terrance D. Olson *
if the reader acquires a sense of how this outlook differs
from the ways in which we usually perceive people.
Because its theoretical underpinnings are not included
here, the sketch may appear deceptively simple; its
implications may not be readily apparent to everyone.
However, the theory from which the sketch is drawn
accounts for much of what Freud called the
"psychopathology of everyday life," including the difficult
problems of modern family life, and it sets forth the
conditions that must be satisfied in order for families to be
healthy and whole.
There are two axes along which the theory intersects the
theme of this issue. One concerns what we teach about the
nature of family life and the other concerns how we teach
it. We have chosen to concentrate on the first of these axes
and to defer to another context a discussion of new
directions in learning that are implied by our theory.

A family iife <ducaloTs suggesled solulions of family problems
will spring from his btliefs aboullhe soums of human conflict. This
pap.,. shlchts a Iheory of conflict Ihal is rooled in Ihe individual's
bdTayal of his/her own fundamenlal valuts. Hypocrisy and stlfdectplion tnsue, and individuals insidiously provoh each olhtr 10 do
Ihe very Ihings for which Ihey blame one anolhtr. This means thai
people can dtsisl from Ihe alliludes Ihatthrow Ihem inlo conflicl and
live harmoniously. Bul btcaust of Iheir stlf-deceplion, suing how 10
do this is nol easy. Ullimattly, Ihe solution lies in moral
mponsibilily. Implicalions for family life educalors art e:rplortd.

Whatever we do in teaching people to live together
productively and lovingly in families will depend upon our
beliefs about why things go wrong in family situations. A
family life educator's practice is tied to his or her theory,
even though that theory may not have been explicitly
formulated. Does he/she think that people whose families
are in conflict can be victims of one another and the
situation, or do they collaborate in the problems from
which they suffer, even when they seem to be victims? This
is the root question because its answer determines whether
such people can in fact do anything to eliminate the
problems, and, therefore, determines what educators
should teach about how a healthy family life can be
achieved. We think the next decade will witness
revolutions in traditional thinking about this issue, and
these revolutions will dictate new practices in all the socalled helping services, including education.
A basis for this hope is a new theory of human behavior
that appears in a forthcoming book and includes a new way
of accounting for conflict. According to the theory,
participants in conflict situations systematically deceive
themselves about the sources of their difficulties. The book
explains how, in our era, we have tended to import these
self-deceptions into our theories about human conduct; our
prevailing conceptions of humanity tend to partake of our
self-deceptions. To these culturally dominant conceptions
of humanity there is an alternative that is shown to be
conceptually more powerful than any of them and that
unifies in a single point of view the manifold observations
of social behavior that have led many to regard human
beings as hopelessly complex.'
This presentation does not set forth the alternative
theory of which we speak, for doing so would require a
careful dismantling of some of our fundamental
presuppositions about people. Instead, we will provide a
simple sketch of the outlook on human conflict that the
new theory suggests. Our purpose will have been achieved

Values and Conflict
First, conflict among people is related to their values; we
can act either in accordance with, or contrary to, those
values. In particular situations we can feel morally
summoned to do a particular thing, or constrained not to do
something; it is in such situations that our values make
contact with our conduct. These feelings to do or to desist
may be called "moral imperatives."
Such felt moral imperatives do not necessarily express
what others expect of us, or even the general morality of
our community, but embody values that are personal and
perhaps unique to us. We are not saying that there are
universal moral imperatives, but only that people do, from
time to time, feel morally constrained to do or not to do
particular things. Examples: a father feels that it is right to
spend time, this evening, helping his daughter with her
mathematics assignment. An uncle senses that he is called
upon by his conscience to apologize to a nephew whom he
has treated demeaningly. A teacher understands that she is
obligated to do the best she can to help her students learn
and grow. There is nothing inherently immoral about
refusing to help one's daughter or failing to apologize or
even teaching moderately but not superbly well, but for
these individuals, in these particular situations, the actions
we've described would constitute actively going against
their own commitments; for them, the actions would be
immoral. We call this strictly personal immorality "selfbetrayal," in order to convey the idea implicit in it of being
untrue to oneself.
Not surprisingly, this inauthenticity shows up in
whatever one does in carrying out one's self-betrayal. One
will conduct oneself hypocritically-will live in a lie-in an
effort to make the personal wrong that is being done seem

-c. Terry Warner is Professor of Philosophy and Terrance
D. Olson is Professor of Family Sciences at Brigham
Young University.
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Now in our tradition of human behavior studies, as in our
daily life, we tend to take Howard at his word. In his view,
circumstances, either in his own make-up or in the
environment, are responsible for his conduct; he has
become angry because Sara has been pestering him, or
because he wanted to watch the game, or because of his hard
day. As observers, our assumption is that we understand
Howard when we can explain, by reference to factors
outside his control, why he acted as he did and that those
factors make his irritability and impatience
understandable. In the last analysis-so this traditional
doctrine would have us believe-Howard is not an agent so
much as a patient. He does not act but is acted upon. He is
not responsible for his behavior toward his daughter, for
there are extenuating circumstances which excuse him for
his conduct.
Against this standard view of the situation, we are
suggesting that the way Howard sees and feels about Sara
is part of his endeavor to justify himself. He is actively
insisting that he is Sara's victim. For if in this altercation
with her he is seen as a patient rather than as an agent-if
his perceptions and feelings are seen as caused by her or
the circumstances rather than produced by him-then he
cannot be held responsible. He is exonerated. Thus, his
upset feelings are part of the lie he lives; they are evidence
that something outside himself-his work, Sara's
inconsiderateness, etc.-is responsible for the trouble that
he is, in fact, stirring up. "See how inconsiderate you are,"
is the message he is conveying to her, "to produce this
much anger in me?"
Does this mean, then, that Howard "really knows" what
he's doing?-that he's just playing a part?-that he doesn't
actually feel angry? No, he is not merely pretending; he is
not harboring a secret knowledge that he is living a lie. His
emotions are aroused and could be measured by a galvanic
skin indicator. But there is nevertheless a sense in which
his emotion is not genuine; for, contrary to what he thinks,
nothing external is making him angry. Howard's anger is
genuine in that it is felt, but inauthentic in that it is not
caused by anything that is happening to him. He becomes
angry as a non-verbal means of proving that circumstances
are making him angry.
Of course we wonder about Howard's authenticity when
we hear his sudden pleasantness on the telephone with
Fred (especially since Fred's call comes as Howard's team
gets the ball, first and goal, on the opponent's eight yard
line). If we have just entered the room we will not guess
that a moment earlier he was angry. But we do not need to
observe how chameleon-like Howard is in order to see that
he is inauthentic. He is giving off clues constantly. We can
see this by comparing him to another father, whom we may
call "Howard II," who simply helps his daughter when he
feels he should. Howard II will have no occasion to carry on
defensively, to blame Sara II, or to value the televised game
inordinately. He will simply help. The same is true of yet
another Howard, Howard III, who when asked by Sara III
for help, feels, for her sake, he should not help. So he says
simply, "You need to work that out for yourself." Again, no
defenSiveness, no accusation, no inordinate lust for
television. Proving themselves justified is not an issue for
these other fathers, because their justification is not put in
question by what they are doing. The telltale clues that

right. This inauthenticity can take such forms as
depression, low self-esteem, bitterness, irritability,
jealousy, and many other maladaptive attitudes. We have
chosen to illustrate it initially with a very ordinary instance
of family selfishness:
Sara:
Daddy, I can't figure this math problem out.
Howard:
(her father, watching Monday night football,
and feeling that he should help Sara) Sure you
can. You've just got to struggle with it.
But I've tried, and I'm getting nowhere. If you
Sara:
could ... (Sara begins to cry, her head on her
book.)
You're trying to take the easy way. They
Howard:
wouldn't give you the problem if they hadn't
taught you all you have to know to solve it.
(His voice rising) Why do you wait until I'm
right in the middle of watching my game? In
fact, you should be in bed, young lady. Why
do you leave your homework 'til the last
minute, anyway?
I didn't think it would take me very long...
Sara:
Well, ask your sister upstairs. She had the
Howard:
same math last year. She's going to know it
better than I am.
But I've just got one question.
Sara:
(his anger blossoming) Sara, I'm tired of you
Howard:
trying to get me to do your work for you. Now
I've told you what you need to do to get that
done and you're just avoiding doing it.
Sara:
(pouting) When Danny asks for help you help
him...
Oh boy ... Look, if you would do what you are
Howard:
supposed to do, I would be glad to help you.
There is a difference between helping Danny
after he's struggled with something and
helping you when the only struggle you've had
is to ask me to do your work for you.
Sara:
But Danny's smart. He doesn't have to
struggle...
Howard feels that he ought to help Sara, but is refusing
to do so. His encouragement of her to struggle with the
problem until she can figure it out might in other
circumstances be good advice, but in this case he is giving it
as part of an effort to mask and justify his own moral
failure-to make it seem right. He also accuses her of
procrastinating, complains that she is intruding unfairly on
his time, and gets angry and impatient over her
inconsiderateness of his own needs and desires.
Howard is not pretending; he is not acting a lie. He is, as
we sometimes say, living a lie. The very way he sees Sara, as
inconsiderate and intrusive, is part of the lie, and so is the
anger he feels about her inconsiderateness. In this
particular case the value he is placing on watching the
football game, which makes her request of him insensitive
and unreasonable, is part of the lie. These are all
interconnected aspects of the lie he is living-the selfdeception he is in. The way he sees and feels about the
situation is part of his effort to justify himself in not doing
what he himself feels is right.'
From Howard's point of view, Sara's inconsiderateness
and procrastination is the problem; or else the pressure he
felt at work, or else his strong desire to watch the game.
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feeling of self-sacrifice and moral nobility, work out the
problems with Sara. He would condescendingly answer her
questions. His explanations would be attended by a
strained patience. Inwardly, he would be congratulating
himse1f on his self-control. In 15 minutes the homework
would be done, and Howard would have a sense of having
risen above the selfish level on which most fathers operate
and, in spite of his daughter's irritating irresponsibility,
done his duty. But he would have given Sara everything
except himself. His would have been a refusal to help her in
the guise of "doing all he could."
Moreover, Sara would not have felt helped. The attitude
of her father would have put her down, just as, in the actual
case, his anger did. She would not have responded
well-would not have tried hard to solve the problem for
herself. In the future she would probably be less inclined to
ask for help when she needed it. And this would have given
Howard more justification for feeling that his daughter was
irresponsible and that he wa;, ,,~thoutlosing his temper or
even uttering a harsh word, rising above adversity.
So whether Howard is childish or self-righteous, he
provokes Sara to do what he blames her for, and thus
validates in his mind his self-justification. In both of these
cases she is reciprocally provoking him by the way she
evades her responsibility and accuses him in her heart.
Whatever their styles of self-betrayal, they are both
provoking the other and by this means extorting validation
for the lie being lived.
We can represent this situation in the following diagram:

Howard gives off are his protestations and accusations-his
stylizing of himself as being wronged. This would be true
even if Sara IDUt lazy and inconsiderate, as he says, and
even if the game IDUt the greatest superbowl contest of all
time. Self-justification of the sort we are studying is a sign
that, by the individual's own values, something is not right.
Another point about Howard's self-deception needs to
be understood. The features of conduct that we have
described do not OCCIIT in 5tqlltnct; they are not mental steps
he goes through in order to blame someone for what he
himself is doing. He does not first feel he ought to help
Sara, then betray himself, then cast about for a lie to live as
a cover for this self-betrayal, and then work up an emotion
to show that he is Sara's victim. Rather, his self-betrayal is
the living of such a lie, the working up of such an emotion.
It takes neither planning nor particular intelligence to do it;
Archie Bunker, for example, is as adept as anyone you
couldmeel.
So one can't "catch oneself' in the process of producing
the sort of encompassing, behavioral lie we are describing.
To betray oneself is already to be living it. Self-betrayal, in
this sense, is a resistant perceptual style freely chosen by
the individual.
There is more to say about the trouble that Howard
creates and his method of creating it to make himself seem
innocent By seeing Sara as inconsiderate and by feeling
inconvenienced, irritated and, finally, angry about her
inconsiderateness, he makes himself out to be her victim.
By this means he makes it clear that he bears no
responsibility for the trouble he is helping create. But of
course if he is her victim then she is his victimizer. Howard
is accusing his daughter-letting the family think she is
insensitive, lazy, and disorganized-as part of exonerating
himself in his own failure to act responsibly.
What about Sara's feelings in the scene we have
presented? How would you feel if you were Sara-fairly
dealt with or put down? Would you want to take
responsibility to do your homework? Whether or not Sara
started out acting responsibly and unself-consciously in
seeking her father's help, she did not do so once he
attacked her. She began to sob softly. She made excuses.
She followed the very pattern of her father's self-betrayal:
she was defensive and accusing. From her point of view her
father and the circumstances were responsible for the
trouble. She is not the agent that he accuses her of being.
She is a patient.
This brings us to a surprising and important principle:
the responsibility--evading, accusing attitude of the selfbetrayer-Howard in this case-tends to proooh in thO;i hi
"CCIIS6 Iht otTlJ bth"oioT of IDhich ht IICCII5<S Ihnn. If they accept
the provocation, as Sara did, then the self-betraver has his
proof that they are to blame and that he is innoc~nt. Clearly
Howard can say that he is not simply imagining that Sara is
irresponsible. Her behavior even now proves that she isshe whimpers, she makes excuses, she tries to say that he is
being unfair.'
The variations upon this theme are many. For example,
the style of self-betrayal that we have described for both
Howard and Sara we call "childish." But Howard might act
self-righteously instead of childishly. In such a case he
might ceremoniously switch off the television-his team
still has first and goal on the opponent's eight-and, with a

F~'.~

Collusion

We call this kind of destructive cooperation ",1/"5io",.
y,,'hen people collude-when each provokes or entice~ the
other to do the very thing he says he hates-each is making
himself out to be the other's victim. Each is constanth'
ready to take offense at what the other does. "'ithouttheir
collusive self-betrayal, there would be no occasion for
enmity between them.
Lest it appear that the simple model we have been
developing is simplistic, let us consider a more involved
and convoluted instance. The marriage of Robert and
Marcia was on the verge of ending. Marcia was at the end
of her tether because Robert was insensitive, thoughtless,
and un\~~ling to "communicate." She was obsessed with
the idea that he was philandering, or at least flirting; she
was sure that he wanted to abandon her in favor of
someone less dowdy and more exciting. She blamed him
for her claustrophobic feelings in the confined world
populated only by herself and her children.
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themselves. "See how irresponsibly you have been acting:'
Howard seems to say, "in order to irritate me to this
extent!" Their responses to one another are not passive, but
purposeful. In an enormous variety of ways people make
themselves unhappy in order to justify themselves in the
compromises they are making of their own values.

For a long time neither family nor friends had observed
evidence of what she accused Robert of; on the contrary, he
seemed to them to love her genuinely. In fact, she herself
never cited evidence of his supposed infideltiy; she simply
"knew" that it was so: "A woman knows:' she often said.
When he protested his innocence, she accused him of
compounding his unfaithfulness with dishonesty. When
friends or family defended him, she accused them of
collaboration. She sobbed on her pillow at night until she
thought her heart would break. Her contention was that
she grieved more than other women who were similarly
situated because of her idealism about marriage and
because she had "given my heart totally to my husband."
She told her troubles to anyone that would listen, asking
them how she could possibly have the marriage she had
longed for-how she could possibly cherish, honor, and be
intimate with a man who was as self-interested and callous
as Robert.
'In fact, despite her endless protestations, Marcia never
lovingly gave Robert her heart. Many times she felt that she
ought to; "giving oneself" in marriage was an obsession
with her. But she did not. The moral imperative that she
felt, or placed upon herself, did not come to her in the form
of a general requirement to love Robert: instead it was
specific to situations. Sometimes she would feel that she
ought to prepare a favorite dish for him; other times to
touch him, to look into his eyes, to make him a gift, or to
thank him for something he had done. On these occasions
when she felt a particular action morally required of her,
she violated her moral sensibility and did not act as she felt.
The result was that she saw him through accusing eyes.
From her point of view, even the expressions on his face
were irritating. It wasn't simply in her manner that she
insisted that Robert was preventing her from loving him, it
was in the very way she saw him that she carried out this
insistence.
No one will be surprised to learn that this continuous
hostile behavior of Marcia's provoked Robert's retaliation.
Feeling wounded and unfairly dealt with, he viewed
coming home as a trial by fire, and stayed away as often as
he could. The more he stayed away, the more Marcia had
her proof that he didn't love her and the more reason she
had to complain, to withhold her favors, and to feel
depressed. For his part, the more Marcia attacked him, the
more reason Robert had to feel abused, and the more
justified he felt in not wanting to come home. So Robert
and Marcia helped each other create the forces that
separated them from each other.
To each of them it looked like the other was at fault, and
an outside observer might well have said that they were
incompatible. But our view is that each engaged in a series
of free acts of self-betrayal that not only took the other's
behavior as an excuse but actually provoked the other to
that behavior.
What we have been exploring here is a way of
understanding human conflict that differs from traditional
explanations. We are suggesting that, at least in many
cases, human beings are not the victims of provocations;
situations do not overcome them. Their provoked
responses-whether of impatience, resentment, anger,
irritation, self-pity, or fear-are not effects of causes that lie
beyond their control but are instead means of justifying

The Self-Betrayer is Self-Deceived
In considering this possibility that we conspire with others
to produce the unhappiness that afflicts us, we encounter a
pec;uliar problem. The problem is that this conspiratorial
behavior does not look like what it is. From an observer's
point of view it appears that either Howard is sincerely put
out by the unreasonable request of an irresponsible
daughter or else that he is producing his irritated behavior
"on purpose." If he is producing it on purpose, he is merely
pretending-play-acting, if you will-and is not really
unhappy at all. If he is sincere, then the explanation we are
giving of his behavior is far off the mark. Thus, it appears
that our explanation can't be right; Howard's irritation is
either intentional, and he's not really irritated, or else he's
really irritated and not acting intentionally. Howard can't
be actually making himself miserable.
This conclusion is not valid. In the new personality
theory from which this article is drawn, it is shown that the
conclusion is fallacious because it is based on Howard's
own self-deceiving way of seeing the situation. Howard
and Marcia blame others as being causes of their feelings.
They are, therefore, deceiving themselves as to the fact that
they themselves are producing these feelings as means of
accusing Sara and Robert. They are, therefore, not simply
pretending to be irritated; being deceived, they are in
earnest about it. Their irritability or suffering is something
they actually fetl, in spite of the fact that it is a falsification
(neither Sara nor Robert is really causing it).
But if we were to ask Howard if he is being completely
honest in his interaction with Sara, the only way as a selfdeceiver he could interpret our question would be: "Do you
sincerely feel put out, or are you merely pretending?" Since
it is obvious to him that he is not pretending, he thinks our
question is ridiculous; he wonders why we mistrust him.
''Howard, we think you are blaming Sara so you 'can
cover up your unwillingness to help her as you should."
''You think I'm just pretending to be upset so I can watch
the game? Is that what you think?"
"No, you're really upset all right."
::rhat's ri~~t! So I can't be just pretending, can I?"
Well,no.
"So quit accusing me of being dishonest. Look, I'm so
aggravated I haven't even enjoyed the game."
Even if no such confrontation takes place, Howard may
succeed in deceiving us as well as himself by his
performance. This he does if we accept his self-deceiving
viewpoint, which is that either he is sincere, really feels put
out, is Sara's victim and is not responsible, or else is only
pretending to feel this way, is cynically manipulating and
misusing Sara, and is, therefore, responsible.
From Howard's point of view, if he is not being honest it
can only mean that he isn't really upset. He cannot be both
upset and responsible. So if, like Howard, we let the issue
become, '1s he sincere in his feelings or not?" then we also
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others. It is this newly released set of feelings that can
touch the hearts of former colluders and prompt them to
respond in kind.
After observing hundreds of cases, we have become
convinced that although the solutions to the self-deceiver's
personal problems are complicated and difficult from his
own perspective, they are actually as simple as telling
oneself, and living by, the truth-which is that he himself
has been collaborating in the conflict situations that trouble
him. It's the best-the only-way to invite the other family
members to reciprocate. We have witnessed this in cases of
infidelity, depression, alcoholism, teenage rebellion,
intensely recriminatory divorce proceedings, and many
others. The offendedness of each party, the psychic pain,
the feelings of being trapped, the inconsolable feelings,
even the self-deceiving tactics by which the principals both
retaliate and make it appear that the course of events is
beyond their control-all these tactics can be given
up-summarily.

will be assuming that he cannot be deceilJing himself in these
feelings-that he cannot really make himself miserable! We
will be rejecting out of hand the kind of theory being
discussed in this paper-not because of any evidence we
have, but because we are colluding in, and taken in by, the
self-deceptions of self-deceivers.
We cannot stress this point too strongly, for it follows
that if Howard can deceive himself, he can make himself
miserable, and he can provoke Sara to act irresponsibly so
that he will have proof that it is she, and not he, who is
responsible for his misery. Similar comments can be made
about Marcia. People can turn their families into
battlegrounds and simultaneously insist, in earnest, that it
is not their fault-indeed, that they are doing everything in
their power in spite of the offensive behavior of the others
involved.
In our era it has been unfavorable to speak this way.
Holding people responsible for their misery seems a
callous attitude. Often the most miserable among us come
from pathological homes-surely they are not responsible.
But we suggest that it is not the theory we are presenting
but the currently accepted ones that tend to be callous. If
people are not responsible for their emotional problems,
then it is not in their power to correct them. But if they are
responsible-if their unhappiness is the product of the
morbid collaboration we are calling "collusion"-then they
can change. They can cease to betray themselves. They can
come out of self-deception. Correcting family problems is,
in general, not something they do-it requires no special
expertise-but something they undo: they stop living a lie.
Howard (entering Sara's room): May I talk with you a
minute? (Sara does not answer, but leaves her
head buried in her hands.)
Well, I shouldn't... Gee, I
Howard: Sara, I'm I, er
don't know how to .
Sara: It's okay, Daddy. I forgive you.
When Howard gives up his self-betrayal his anger
dissipates. The feelings he then has for his daughter are
non-accusing. He feels love. And even though his
confession of the truth is inexpert in the extreme, it is
genuine, and she senses how he cares. (This is equally true
of Marcia. Her fears and self-pity will vanish as she begins
to do precisely as she feels she should.)
That is the conventional situation. But there is another,
equally appropriate possibility.
Sara: Daddy, can I talk with you?
Howard: Have you got that homework done?
Sara: Daddy, I've been having bad feelings toward you.
Oh, Daddy, I'm sorry. Please forgive me.
Howard (melting): Sara, you shouldn't be asking for
forgiveness. I should.
Sara's unhappiness was her own responsibility; she
made herself a victim and, by this ploy, accused her father
of being a monster, unfeeling, and unfair. The only way out
for her too, is to cease to live this lie. And we can say the
same of Robert.
Of course, one colluder cannot, by giving up his selfdeception, guarantee that others in the collusion will follow
suit. But he does, by withdrawing his accusing attitude,
give them the best possible encouragement to do so. This is
not all; we believe that what people feel when they cease
betraying themselves is love and authentic concern for

Self-Betrayal and Family Life Education
Suppose that all we have been saying is true. How would
an educator get someone to see that it is so? What strategies
might he teach by which families could abandon their
tactical devices of hostility, fear, impatience, and self-pity
and leave self-deception behind? How, in short, would he
recommend that people release the love for one another
that is in them? Recall that it didn't work when Howard
was confronted with the truth; his self-deception meant
that he also deceived himself about the suggestion that he
might be self-deceived.
In responding to this question, we want to draw on an
implication that our view has for the conduct of family
counselors and therapists as well as educators. Indeed, we
think that it obliterates the distinction between them. For if
it is correct and people come to understand family conflict
in terms of it, that very understanding requires a letting go
of their former views so they no longer betray themselves;
one cannot freely acknowledge the truth and
simultaneously live a lie. By this means they put
themselves in a position to see what needs to be done to
heal the family relationships and to have the caring attitude
necessary to do it without collusion.
Let us imagine that we have just finished a lecture on
marital harmony. A student, Tammy, comes up seeking
further understanding. We sense that the question she asks
is not as hypothetical as she wants it to appear; there is
urgency in her voice. She asks about her friend, Marcia,
whom we have already met, and she describes Marcia's
situation.
What will we say to Tammy? We have already learned
that if Tammy suspects Marcia of provoking the problem
in any way-if she tries to see the husband's side of it,
suggesting that Marcia's definition of the situation is not
completely accurate-Marcia can only understand Tammy
as saying that she's insincere. Tammy may have wanted to
explore the possibility that Marcia might be trapped in a
tragic self-deception, but she can only be heard as accusing
her of crassly manipulating both Robert and Tammy! In her
very way of seeing Robert and hearing criticism, Marcia
will pervert the truth into something that is patently false.

19

AMCAP JOURNAl/JANUARY 1984

I'm going to suggest either that they be indulged, because
their problems aren't their fault, or condemned for being
cynical manipulators." If this is our position, we will not be
able to see the real solution to the problem, for the problem
involves them in being neither victims nor phonies.
Whatever we suggest will only lead them to deal with
counterfeit symptoms and may make matters worse.
Fortunately, we are often guided in our professional roles
more by our deep human responsiveness to people than by
our theories. As a result, good things frequently happen:
some of the individuals we teach discover that the key is
simply for people to be honest with themselves, to forgive
and forget, to reach out in love toward others. We are more
effective than we would be if we always relied on current
theories of conflict, but not nearly as effective as we could
be if we understood that it is as people rather than as
experts and manipulators of lives that we help others.
For several years we and several colleagues have been
developing and informally testing an approach to teach
people the principles we have discussed in this paper,
believing that for a person simply to understand them is for
him to clear away some of the evasion and cover-up by
which he avoids the truth. We use case studies. We have
the students write cases on their own. Almost always they
identify with the cases they hear and write and in so doing
are already telling themselves the truth about past selfbetrayals. We have designed learning exercises in which
they imaginatively enter a world that is free of
offendedness and blame. The imaginative exercises can be
as good as actual experience when students see others
realistically-with compassion and without accusation.
Those who do this are truthful about circumstances that
have troubled them. In this, they are true to their own
values; we have not imposed values upon them.
The learning experience we have described is not
painful; the truth is painful only for those whose private
recollections are counterfeit "confessions." For others the
experience is liberating. Moreover, the relief and freedom
that is enjoyed is the achievement of those who have it;
while no one else could have charted the path that would
lead them there, they themselves follow it unerringly. Once
people have this experience, they own the secret; they are
independent of us; they can continue their self-liberation
into as many facets of their lives as they will.
In describing all of this so facilely, we do not mean to
give the impression that just because this process is simple,
it is also easy. It isn't. The process is meticulously designed
to avoid collusion between teachers and students-to keep
from assisting them in any evasion of responsibility they
might attempt in the guise of "getting an intellectual
understanding." For this reason, it is more demanding than
any other teaching we have tried.

Marcia might react in any number of ways, all of which will
be furtherances of the lie she is living.
"Are you suggesting that our troubles are my fault7 I
thought you were my friend and would help me cope with
the terrible situation, but instead you take his side!"
Or: "You think I enjoy being hurt, like some kind of
martyr? You're as insensitive as Robert is. I want to be
happy, just like other people."
Or: "Look, I've tried everything I know how to do. I start
conversations, cook things Robert likes, get the children to
bed early so we can have time together. But he leaves to go
out with his friends or watches television.
Or even (abjectly): '1 know you're right. It must be my
fault. I think another woman could have made him happy.
I'm just not the kind of woman who appeals to men.
If the attitude that we lead Tammy to have toward
Marcia provokes Marcia to respond in any of these ways,
Tammy will have "climbed into Marcia's world" with her,
allowing her to define the situation for Tammy, and will be
colluding with Marcia in her lie.
Tammy's advice is very useful to Marcia, because, by
seeing Tammy as either agreeing with her or as rejecting
her, she has evidence that she cant help what's going on.
Marcia's offense-taking is useful to Tammy also, for she
then has proof that Marcia even mistreats those who are
trying to "help" her. Tammy will be colluding with her in
the way Sara colluded with Howard: she will be validating
Marcia's lie.
We see already that teaching is not tJttrapeutically neutral.
Attitudes, even of friends, either calm or fuel selfdeceptions and either quell or exacerbate family conflict.
Family life education is a weightier matter than some sorts
of instruction. This becomes more obvious when we realize
that Tammy might be Marcia herself. She comes with a
disguised plea for help against her husband. If we have the
wrong kind of theory, we will collude with her; we will
provoke her to pursue even more aggressively than before
her evasion of responsibility.
We are no better off if we teach Tammy to regard
Marcia's husband as a problem to be dealt with and to
think that Marcia needs to learn assertiveness, strategies
for coping, or counter-manipulative tactics. If Marcia is
provoking or at least utilizing her husband's insensitivity in
order to justify her own failure to give herself to the
marriage, then by thinking that Marcia must learn any
techniques for dealing with him, Tammy will again "climb
into her world" as surely as if she opposed her, and
reinforce her lie that the problem is how to deal with him. Or,
if Marcia is Tammy, we, the teachers, will be the ones to
reinforce the lie.
The pitfall for family life professionals of all kinds,
including teachers, is the danger of participating either
theoretically or personally in the collusive mix of the
families they talk about or counsel. When we suppose that
people can be victimized by one another-when we accept
their contentions that their anger, hostility, offendedness,
depression, indifference, self-pity or bitterness can be
caused by the other parties involved-we collude. We
validate their attempt to shift responsibility to others or to
circumstances beyond their control. We give them the
message: "Either these people are indeed victims, or else
they are phonies, deliberately causing all of this trouble. 50
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Implications for the Future
We think that besides our own approach, others will be
developed, based upon the sort of understanding of family
problems that we have sketched in this paper. Whatever
form they take, we suspect they will all imply that the
distinctions between educator, counselor and therapist will
Com:/uded on page 25
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manner which Robert, also betraying himself, sees as
making it impossible to stay home: "She just wants to
harangue. I'm getting out of here." Our data may actually
be skillful collaborations in the "non-communication" of
Marcia and Robert. (For an observer who is not selfdeceived, it is clear that Marcia and her husband are
sending messages which are being received very well
indeed.) Where the possibility exists of the counselor or
researcher participating in the self-deceptions of families,
then neither diagnosing nor data-gathering can be a
straightforward thing.
This means that in the end we cannot abdicate our own
humanity in our study of and assistance to families. An
authentic, open, caring relationship with them is a
precondition of both understanding and helping them.
There can be no dispassionate science of family life nor a
detached, quasi-medical treatment of its miseries. Here is
one region in which the effective professional is first and
last a human being,. in every respect one with the people he
serves, and in which effective service is only partly a matter
of art and even less a matter of science, but predominantly
a matter of love.
We do have to pay attention to our experiences; social
data are not irrelevant. But they are unreliable unless we
make our observations with the totality of ourselves, in
community with the families we serve. The idea that we
can stand apart from this community, scanning it as if it
were a cadaver, responding to it with only the "objective"
portions of ourselves and suppressing our full range of
human, compassionate responses, and obligations-this is a
repudiation of our own humanity, which is our only
instrument for understanding and helping others. This
repudiation may be the most destructive self-deception of
all.

Continutd from page 20

tend to fade. They should all teach rather than counsel,
guide, manipulate, so that students will more likely act selfreliantly rather than feel provoked to either capitulate or
resist.
There will be no room in this broadly conceived
educative function of professionals for taking
responsibility away from the individuals in the family. By
what they teach and tpe attitude with which they teach, the
professional should help individuals take responsibility. If
family members refuse to take responsibility, the
professional will have done all that could have been done.
For example, there should be little need for the
professional to hear histories of family troubles, for it is
usually counterproductive. Family members tend to repeat
their accusing perception of conflict, helplessness, and
suffering, and to ask the professional to reinforce it, either
by agreeing or disagreeing with them. In rehearsing his
"story," a person can be "honest" in conveying his real
feelings, but be as self-deceiving in continuing to have
these feelings as he was in having them in the first place.
Diagnosis of specific emotional patterns and
prescriptions should be eliminated insomuch as these
procedures set the professional up as a "doctor of the soul":
if the "doctor" professes to know what is wrong, his
pronouncements will tend to be self-deceivingly heard by
his "patient" and thereby validate the self-deception. The
"patient" is then assisted in evading his responsibility for
the problems that beset him. All of this implies that the
family life professional can only be effective when his own
life is an honest one. Otherwise, he will inevitably use the
teaching situation for his own self-justifying purposes. He
may, like Howard, see his students as irritants and himself
as doing all he can in spite of the difficulty of teaching such
people. No expertise will protect him from the effects of
this kind of self-deception. If he relies on techniques, he
will be manipulative, and his attitude will be that
techniques are responsible if good things happen (rather
than the honesty of the individuals involved), and he will
encourage his students or clients to rely on such techniques
themselves, rather than simply tell themselves the truth.
People might resist his gem-like utterances or become his
devoted disdples, but either way, they will be assisted in
their flight from being the independent, whole human
beings they are capable of being. Ultimately, the best
family life educators will be the persons who teach students
what it means to be independent of them.
To our schematic vision of families, their problems, and
their hope for wholeness, some might say, "Perhaps so. But
then again, perhaps not. What we have read is not an
empirical treatment. lt might be a fairy tale-a behavioral
sdence fiction." There is an error in this objection. We
cannot blithely gather data about the etiology of family
problems without incurring the risk that these data are
drawn from the self-deceptive worlds of families in
collusion. Examples: "Marcia and her husband do not
communicate. Her husband either won't or can't. This
isolates and wounds Marcia. She withdraws, pouts, and
falls into depression." But the truth may be that it is Marcia
who helps prevent communication by taking offense in a

"This article, originally published in famil!, Rdali",,>, 1981,30,493-503, is
reprinted here with the permission of the authors and the publisher.
Endnotes

'This theory is set forward in a forthcoming book, by C. Terry Warner.
that deals with self-deception, compulsivity. interpersonal conflict,
.1uthenticily. freedom. and indi\'idual and social cohesiveness. The present
article is also based in part upon materials used in the alternative to
therapy .lnd counseling that .."e shall mention later.
~So

Howard's irritability is not something Sara is provoking; it is not an
ingrained love of football; dnd it is not a residue of day-long pressures at
the office. (Indeed the compelling attraction in the game l.lsts only so long
as he needs it, in helping him justify his now leaving it, and his having felt
the office pressures all day may well have been the very sort of selfexonerating behavior he is exhibiting with Sara.) The irritability is instead
Howard's way of betraying himself and getting away with it-of defaulting
upon his responsibility by making Sara seem responsible for the trouble
he is creating.
'A substantial part of Howard's self-justification in his self-betrayal
consists in provoking the daughter he blames to betray herself. Her
misbehavior serves well to exonerate him. Self-betrayers are troublemakers who can't see that they are. This, then, is the surprising principle
concerning human conflict: by his accusing attitude, the self-betrayer
provokes those he accuses to do the very kind of thing he accuses them of;
he collaborates in producing the problems that make him miserable; he
lends his energies to create the very troubles from which he suffers.
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